Ideas from 'Mental Content' by Peter Schulte [2023], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mental Content' by Schulte,Peter [CUP 2023,978-1-009-21725-5]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
|
23805
|
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
|
23796
|
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented
|
|
23793
|
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow
|
|
23795
|
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions
|
|
23806
|
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science
|
|
23804
|
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties
|
|
23792
|
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
|
23802
|
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
|
23797
|
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
|
23799
|
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning
|
|
23800
|
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
|
23798
|
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable
|